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Abstract 
This study analyzes the effectof changes in corporate controlon the way shareholdersbenefit 
from the announcements of selling and buying airlines, thus contributing to the literature on 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in emerging markets. Using a methodologyof event 
study, including GARCH and OLS models, we find evidence that some selling companies 
obtain abnormal returns that are statisticallysignificant after the announcement of the 
M&A. However, when the merger is not strategic, the companies present 
statisticallysignificant negative abnormal returns. The resultsare not conclusive when 
analyzing the effecton the valueof the buying companies.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
With the use of mergers and acquisitions (M&As),airlinesfrom many economies at the 
global level have sought to upgrade their capacity for commercialization, stay on the 
market, expand to new markets,andreduce costs tosurvive in an increasingly competitive 
market (Zhang and Aldridge 1997; Clougherty 2002; Merkert and Morrell 2012; Ryerson 
and Kim 2014). Similarly, the volume of M&A announcements in the airline market1in 
Latin American economies has experienced significant growth in recent years. According 
to information from the Datastream database, in the 1990s,only21 announcements were 
reported, while between 2000 and 2013,there were72 announcements, with a growth of 
242.9%. Thus, as a strategy to face the challenges of a globalized market, M&As have 
played a fundamental role in countries’economic growth.  
Given thatM&As are complex phenomena, both in their reasons and results, they have been 
studied from various perspectives. Some works have mainly focused on examining the 
economic and financial implications (Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Shleifer and Vishny 2003; 
Rossy and Volpin 2004; Di Giovanni 2005; Ovtchinnikov 2013) and incentives for 
administrative managementandcorporategovernance in M&A operations (Roll 1986; Jensen 
1986; Kosnik and Shapiro 1997; Starks and Wei 2013). There have also been event studies 
on marketreactionsfollowing M&A announcements (Eckbo 1983; Eckbo and Langohr 
1989; Bhagat et al. 2005). Alternatively, various authors have taken interest in the long-
term behavior of company performance after an M&A operation (Jensen and Ruback 1983; 
Cosh and Guest 2001; Bradley and Sundaram 2004; Daniliuc et al. 2014). 
Generally, the majority of studies concerningM&As have been conducted in the marketsof 
the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe,and Asia2. Pioneering studies in Latin 
Americaon the subject of M&As have been conducted by Fuenzalida et al. (2006), who 
identified the existence of abnormal returnsin the valueof purchased companiesas a result of 
the announcementof a public offerof acquisitionin these countries;by Pablo (2009),who 
studied the determinants of transnational M&As in Latin American countries;andby Vasco 
                                                            
1 SIC Codes 4512 (Air transportation, scheduled), 4513 (Air courier services), and 4522 (Air transportation, 
nonscheduled) 
2For more on the economics of corporate governance and mergers, see Martynova and Renneboog (2008) and 
Gugler and Yurtoglu (2008). 
et al. (2014),who studied the influence of corporate governanceon translational M&A 
activity in Latin American countries. 
The objective of this studyis to analyze the impactof changes in corporate controlon the 
valueof airline companiesin Latin America, i.e.,establishing the expectations on the way 
shareholdersbenefit from announcementsin acquired and acquiring companies, thus 
contributing to the M&A literature in emerging markets, where there is scarcedataon the 
subject. Given the lack of a specific theoretical framework for M&As in the airline 
industry, the study is focused on the general literature on M&As. Our empirical studies 
have examined the effects of M&As on company performance, share price,andvalue 
creation. In this context, some studiesconclude that shareholdersof the acquiring 
companyearn little or nothing, with the possibility that they may even lose (Loderer and 
Martin 1990; Walker 2000; Moeller et al. 2005;Hackbarth andMorellec 2008; Hamza 2009, 
Hitt et al. 2009). By contrast, other empirical studiesshow that on average,shareholdersof 
the acquired companybenefit from M&A announcementsor as a result of the operation, 
with the stock market valueof the companiesthat merge increasing(Schwert 1996; Andrade 
et al. 2001; Goergen and Renneboog 2004; Campa and Hernando 2006; Kiymaz and Baker 
2008). Taking into account that the resultsare to a large extent ambiguous, researchers have 
focused on explaining them from two main perspectives. The first perspective is related to 
rational motivations to conduct the transaction,andthe second is relatedto irrational or 
behavioral motivations.  
Regarding rational motivations, the determinantsof M&As may be analyzed based on the 
neoclassical hypothesis, which suggests that the purpose of mergers between companiesis 
to increase their efficiencyin the face ofchanges, such as regulations, costs,andtechnological 
innovationsthat affect the structure of the industry or cause industrial shocks (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1986; Church and Ware 2000;Jovanovicand Rousseau 2002; Shleifer and Vishny 
2003; Rossy and Volpin 2004). On this subject,Nelson (1959) finds that economic 
movements (e.g., the growth of an economy) andthe business cycle are related to M&A 
activity. For their part, authors such as Gort (1969) and Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) argue 
that shocks andstructural changes in industries (e.g.,deregulation) require the redistribution 
of assets to more productive use, which justifies M&As as a way of achieving this. 
According to Maksimovic and Phillips (2001),a positive demand shock in an industry 
increases the opportunity cost for the inefficientproducer, andconsequently, assetsare 
relocated in search of greater productivity. In his study, Harford (2005) provides evidence 
for the start of M&A waves in an entire economyas a response to structural shocks that 
affect various industriessimultaneously.  
Meanwhile, irrational or behavioral motivationsrelate the appearance of M&As to 
distortions in the market valueof companies (Shleifer and Vishny 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan 2004; Rossy and Volpin 2004; Gugler et al. 2012) or to the personal 
motivations of directors that are not in line with the interests of shareholders (Jensen 1986; 
Roll 1986; Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Kosnik and Shapiro 1997).  
When considering the two alternatives notedaboveandtaking into account that the 
fundamental purpose of an M&A is to generate synergies, empirical studieshave found that 
rational motivations, corresponding to the neoclassical hypothesis, are those that may, to 
the greatest degree,provide benefits to shareholder wealth (Wang 2007; Carpenter and 
Sanders 2008). Meanwhile, irrational or behavioral motivations may be a response to 
valuedestruction for shareholders (Sirower 1997; Wang 2007). In this context, the 
valuecreated for shareholders, derived from the merger, may be explained by the synergies 
in efficiency, including more efficient management, economies of scale andscope, vertical 
integration (Church and Ware 2000; Weston et al. 2004)3, horizontal integration, better 
production techniques, combining complimentary resources, changing assetsto more 
productiveapplications, or market power achieved (Eckbo 1983; García and Trillas 2011).  
There is much consensus as investors expect a company that is being bought to be able to 
include in the final merger price the final benefits of the alliance. Eckbo (1983) argues that 
M&As generate positive abnormal returnsin the selling company.Because it increases the 
probability of efficient collusion between rival producers, the merger generates increased 
commercial valuefor the companiesthrough productive efficiency and the implementation 
of a more efficient production cost policy, apart from lower transaction costs. This is 
reflected in the positive abnormal returnsof the purchased companyon the date of the event, 
                                                            
3Since this may eliminate the double marginalization that emerges when two companies that are in the same 
production chain have great market power or complimentary goods are under common control. 
while the buyer has negative abnormal returnsor returns close to zero on the day of the 
event. Similarly, the resultsfound by Andrade et al. (2001) show that shareholders of the 
selling companyclearly benefit from the merger, withvaluecreation for this 
companyaccumulatingby16 % on average. Meanwhile the impactof the merger on the 
purchasing company, on average on the share value, generates a reduction of 0.7 %, but the 
result is not statistically significant.  
Moreover, Campa and Hernando (2004) find that the valuegenerated for investors of the 
selling companysees, on average, statisticallysignificant positive cumulative abnormal 
returnsat 9% andthat these cumulative returns on the buying companiesare nil. However, 
when distinguishing between the geographical dimensions of the sectors, it is found 
thatindustriesthat had previously seen strict regulation obtain lower abnormal returns than 
when the M&A announcementis made in non-regulated industries. Goergen and 
Renneboog (2004) find a positive abnormal returnof 9% for selling companiesafter 
announcing the transaction. For their part, the acquiring parties obtain a positive and 
statistically significant effectof just 0.7%. Furthermore, the researchers also analyze 
whether the predominant reasons for M&As are synergies, agency problems, or managerial 
arrogance. The resultssuggest that synergiesare the main motivation for offers 
Based on the above literature, the proposed hypotheses about the reaction of the marketto 
anM&A announcement in the airline industryin Latin American economiesare the 
following: 
Hypothesis 1. After the announcementof an M&A, the shareholdersof the selling 
companybenefit by obtaining positive abnormal returnsthat are statistically significant. 
Hypothesis 2. The shareholdersof the buying companyearn littleor nothing or obtain 
negative abnormal returnsafter the announcementof theM&A. 
II. DATA ANDMETHODOLOGY 
A. Data 
The information concerningM&A announcementsin the airline industryfor Latin American 
countriesin the 1996-2013 period was obtained from the Datastream database. This 
databasecontains information on M&A activity for countriesfrom the entire world since 
1985. However, the dataprior to 1996 were not includedbecause there were no 
announcementsin these years for publicly listed companies. The Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codesused were 4512 (air transportation, scheduled), 4513 (air courier 
services),and 4522 (air transportation, nonscheduled). We excludedleveraged buyouts 
(LBOs), spin-offs, recapitalizations, repurchases,andprivatizations4 from the sample. Our 
initial databasecontained 77 announcements. However,toactually capture the effectof 
surprise announcements, the dates were verified in Bloomberg, The Economist Intelligence 
Unit, and online news sources for each countrycomprising the definitive sample. 
Additionally, we excluded from the samplethe announcementsof airlineswhose shares were 
not traded on the day before andafter the announcement because each eventconsists of the 
day before the news, the day of the news,andthe day after the news[T-1,T+1] (Eckbo 1983; 
Mulherin and Boone 2000; Andrade et al. 2001). Finally,after applying the defined 
criteria,the obtained sample is presented in Table 1, which distinguishes between eventsof 
buying andselling companies.  
[Table 1 here] 
The daily share prices for each companyandthe MSCImarket index (Emerging Markets 
Index)have been taken from Bloomberg. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the 
selected companies’performance andthe MSCIfor the analysis period. 
[Table 2 here] 
B. M&A activity in the Latin America Airline industry 
As specified in Table3, from 1996 to 2013, 77 M&A announcementswere reported in the 
airline industryfor the study countries. This level of activity may be the result of many 
factors, including the fact, as stated by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO 
2013), that since1990,Latin Americasaw the beginnings of the implementation of a more 
flexible modelfor negotiating traffic rights. This trend was induced by the processes of 
                                                            
4Privatization is not taken into account because, despite the fact that it shares some determinants with M&A 
processes, studies have found that privatizations have been adopted as an instrument of economic policy 
(Megginson et al. 1994; Megginson and Netter 2001). In this context, government motivations are beyond the 
scope of this study. 
deregulation occurring in the United StatesandEurope,where the open skies model was 
being adopted. We can see that the countrieswith the highest M&A activity in the region 
are Brazil,with a 32.47% share, followed by Mexicowith 22.08%, Argentina and Colombia 
with 10.39%each, Peruwith 6.29%,and Chile with 3.90%, with the rest of the countries 
seeing an activity of less than 3%.  
At the aggregate level, from 1996, we observe a growing trend in terms of M&A 
activityinterrupted in 2002. According to the report presented by the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL 2002), financial turmoil linked 
to falling global stock markets andthe uncertainty created by the 9/11 attacks in the United 
Statesapparently affected world economies,particularly the Latin American markets,due to 
the reduction of foreign direct investment flows from the United StatesandEurope. To this 
must be added the instability already generated by regional financial crises in Brazilin 1999 
and Argentina in 2001, which seem to have induced less M&A dynamism. As of 2010,the 
growth of M&A announcementswas 113.67%, showing signs of recovery after the 
financialcrisis of 2009. 
[Table 3 here] 
Examining other characteristics of the announcements, as shown in Table 4,we find that in 
the study period, 61.04% of announcementswere made by national buyers and20.78% by 
buyers from Latin American countries. A total of 7.79% of the M&A announcementshave 
come from European countries5, 6.49% from the United States,andthe rest from other world 
regions. When observing the annual behavior, this proportion remains relatively 
stable,especially over the last decade. 
[Table 4 here] 
                                                            
5Mainly from Russia, Portugal, the United Kingdom, France, and Poland. The arrangement for the promotion 
and reciprocal protection of investment between countries may be a factor that promotes foreign investment in 
various industries. For example, Brazilhas been the object of foreign investmentin airlinesfrom Portugal, with 
which it has this type of agreement, and the same is true for Bolivia and Great Britainas well as Argentina and 
France. For information on agreements, see http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/main_s.asp. 
Additionally, 46.75% of the M&A announcementsare made between companiesoperating 
in the same industry (targeting)6, while the rest correspond to other objectives, such as 
diversification or vertical integration. Finally, when reviewing the payment method, we 
find that for the entire set of M&A announcementswith disclosed negotiation details, the 
main payment method is cash. Table 5offers more details about the disclosed information.  
[Table5here] 
C. Methodology 
One of the most frequently used methodologiesforassessingboth corporate eventsandthe 
effectsof regulation changes in various industrieshas been “event studies”. These studies are 
used to examine the returns of a companyduring the “event window”to determine whether 
this performance is abnormally positive or negative. The event window is defined as the 
length of time it takesto seek the reaction of the average price—what the researcher 
identifies as “news”received by investors. News represents new information perceived by 
investors, which may change the expected valueof the affected 
companiesandsimultaneously cause abnormal returns (Lamdin 2001)7.  
The theoretical basis of this methodologyis the semi-strong version of the efficient market 
hypothesis. This hypothesisholds that the mean price of a companyreflects at any time its 
best estimate based on available information on the marketof future liquidity flows 
discounted for this company (Cox and Portes 1998; Markiel 2003), assuming that all 
publicly available information is incorporated into the average price8, as agents transmit 
messages with this new information in the market, which becomes publicly available and 
incorporated into the average price,andtherefore,the price provides the best estimate for the 
change in a company’s market value as a result of unexpected announcements. 
                                                            
6We define targeting as the M&As between companies where the first two digits of the SIC code coincide, 
Martynova and Renneboog (2006). 
7To broaden this methodology,see Campbell et al. (1997), Mackinlay (1997), Binder (1998), Kothari and 
Warner (2006), and Aktas et al.(2007). 
8 Ederington and Lee (1995) find that news announcements on macroeconomic variables are completely 
absorbed by the markets in fifteen minutes and that the majority of the reaction in mean prices happens within 
forty seconds from the news announcement. Nevertheless, news on mergers and acquisitions must be 
analyzed in depth by investors and takes more time to be absorbed by the market, but in any case this occurs 
on the day of the news.  
The most widely usedmodelfor estimating the normal performanceof returns andpredicting 
the expected value of the returns of companyjin periodt, not conditioned by event
))/(( jtjt XRE , is the market modelwhere the jtX do not include the event. This modelis 
represented by equation (1) (Fama et al. 1969; Campbell et al. 1997).  
 tjtmjjtj RR ,,,     (1) 
 with 0)( , tjE  and jtjVar  2, )(   
where jtR is the performance of company j in period t , mtR is the performance of the 
company portfolio, j and j are the parameters,and jt is the error term.  
The same modelhas been used to measure the performance of abnormal returns, including a 
dummy to capture the effectof the news, as shown in equation (2). This is the 
methodologyused in our study. 
 tjtjjtmjjtj DRR ,,,,    (2) 
where the coefficient j captures the abnormal returnof action jin the date of event t, 
directly estimated in the regression.  
Toimprove the power of the estimatesas suggested by Campbell et al. (1997)9, the events of 
abnormal returnsin the event windowcan also be aggregated. If we consider 1T to be the first 
observation in the event windowand 2T to be the second, then the aggregationofabnormal 
returnswould be the accumulations ),( 21 TTCAR ,equation (3). 
 

 2
1
),( 21
T
Tt
tARTTCAR  (3) 
Under the nullhypothesis, accumulatedabnormal returnshave a normal distribution with a 
mean of zero anda variance of sigma (Campbell et al. 1997). When there is more than one 
                                                            
9Theevent window, when it is one single event, is given by the observations relative to the day prior to the 
event, the day of the event, and the subsequent day. When there are various events of the same nature, as is 
the case of an M&A, observations are grouped as in the previous casebut considering all the M&ASof the 
company. 
event, i.e., a series, this may be aggregated into a series of sub-events, as shown by Figure 
1. In this study, we group the eventsby companyfor the study period. 
[Figure 1 here] 
The approach displayed inFigure 1 improves the obtained estimates by adding events of the 
same nature throughout time, thus increasing the size of the event window. This 
methodologyhas been used by Trillas (2001) in a case studyof the free cash flow theory,by 
Bel and Trillas (2005) in a studyof collusion in the privatization of the 
telecommunicationssector andby Dnes and Seaton (1999) to study the effectsof regulating 
regional electricity companies in the United Kingdom. The main disadvantage when sub-
events from the window typicallyconsist of three observations (as daily data are used)is that 
the significancetest of abnormal returnsis inadequate for such a small sampleand thus has 
little power (Campbell et al. 1997).  
However, as stated by Savickas (2003)10, an appropriate approach to estimate volatility for 
the conditional process of the variance, which controls for the impactof unrelated events in 
the estimate of window AR , may be represented by equation (4) in the following way:  
 tjtjjtmjjtj DRR ,,,,    (4) 
 ),0( ,, tjtj hN  
 tjjtjjtjjjtj Ddchbah ,1,
2
1,,     
where tjh , is the conditional variance of the variation in time and jjjj dcba ,,, are the 
GARCHspecificationcoefficients (1,1). tjD , is a dummy that equals 1 for the date of the 
eventfor companyjand 0 in another case. j captures the coefficientof abnormal returnson 
the date of the announcement. The conditional variance tjh , provides a natural estimator of 
variance AR . 
                                                            
10Following the seminal contributions of Engle (1982), who specifies the behavior of the conditional 
variationin the time of the variance of returns, and Bollerslev (1986), who generalizes the ARMA model with 
the use of a GARCHmodel. 
To control for the effectof variation in time of the conditional volatility, GARCHmodels offer 
a good alternative for the estimationmethod. Since the contribution of Bollerslev (1986), 
this approach has become an important tool in econometric estimations with financial data. 
The fundamental reason why is that when taking the GARCHapproach, the volatility of the 
returns process,andwith this the increases in the variance when there are induced events, 
may be explicitly modeled(Savickas 2003). 
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
A. Effectson the valueof selling companies 
Table 6 shows the accumulated returns CAR for selling companies. Here we see the 
following results.The airlines Consorcio Aeroméxico SAB de CV fromMexicoand Gol 
Linhas Aéreas Inteligentes SA and TAM Linhas Aéreas SA fromBrazilhave positive 
abnormal returnsthat are statistically significant at 1%, estimated with the GARCH 
methodology. These resultsrange from 2.1% to 8.5%, which are similar when estimating 
with OLS. However, as may be expected, estimating with GARCHimproves their 
significancebecause, for example, Gol Linhas Aéreas Inteligentes SA usingOLS has a 
significance levelof 5%,while with GARCH,it is 1%.These resultsare in line with prior 
studies(Eckbo 1983; Bradley et al. 1988; Schwert 1996;Andrade et al. 2001; Goergen and 
Renneboog 2004; Campa and Hernando 2006; Kiymaz and Baker 2008; García et al. 
2012)andsupport hypothesis 1 from this study. 
[Table 6 here] 
Other important resultsof this research are as follows: it is not enough for the companiesto 
be the selling party to achieve positive abnormal returns,it is alsonecessary for the 
integration to be strategic andfor the integration to create synergiesin valuecreation 
(Sirower 1997). This is the case of the airline Varig SAfrom Brazil, which experienced a 
statistically significant negative abnormal returnof -2.7% (see Table 6). According to 
Bloombergnews, its sale was due to a restructuring process brought on by bankruptcy. In 
this case, it is important to note that for the study period, this company was in a 
restructuring process, whichmayjustify the results. Some important events for this airline 
include the following: on 8 June 2006,an offer from the investment fund Multilog was 
announced for the purchase of Varig SA airlines, which had previously announced its 
bankruptcy, having previously been the largest airlineinBrazil. This offer amounted to 
US$800 million and was financed with bank loans and bond issues. On the same date, it 
was announced that the judge presiding over therestructuring was analyzing a proposal 
from a group of employees, pilots,andflight attendants, offering US$449 million for this 
airline, out of which US$125 million was debt owed to employees. Initially, the employees 
managed to seal the purchase on 20 June 2006. Subsequently, on 28 March 2007, Gol 
Linhas Aereas Inteligentes SA acquired this airline to rescue it from bankruptcy. 
Furthermore, as established by Kosnik and Shapiro (1997), mergers may be justified by 
personal reasons that do not create valuefor the selling companyor where the goals of the 
directors are not aligned with those of the shareholders (Jensen 1986). This is reflected by 
the resultsfor the companiesLAN Airlines SAfrom Chileand Grupo Aeroméxico SAB de 
CVfrom Mexico; the results are not statistically significant. Regarding the former, the 
announcementof the sale of LAN Airlines SA on 25 March 2009 owed more to political 
necessity than to strategic integration, as Sebastián Piñera, who held 27% of the company 
shares, had presidential aspirations, according to news obtained from Bloomberg. For its 
part, on 10 August 2011, the airline Delta announced an investment of US$65 million in 
Grupo Aeroméxico SAB de CV,destined towards the purchase of equity held by the 
companyin the treasury (Reuters 2011), which does not necessarily imply a move in market 
price11. 
B. Effectson the valueof buying companies 
Table 7 reports the resultsobtained from the GARCH and OLS estimates for acquiring 
companies; they do not differ from prior empirical evidence (Loderer and Martin 1990; 
Walker 2000; Moeller et al. 2005; Hackbarth andMorellec 2008; Hamza 2009;Hitt et al. 
2009). Thus, we confirmhypothesis 2 of this study.The airline Avianca SA from Colombia 
and the airlines TAM Linhas Aéreas SA and Varig SA, both from Brazil, did not see 
statistically significant abnormal changes in the return to shareholdersafter the 
announcementof M&As. For their part, Gol Linhas Aéreas Inteligentes SA from 
                                                            
11We should clarify that for the estimates of LAN Airlines SA and Grupo Aeroméxico SAB de CV we only 
have one event each. 
BrazilandLAN Airlines SA from Chile did experience statistically significant positive 
abnormal returnsof 1.4% and 2.0%,respectively. 
[Table 7 here] 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
In the present study, we examine the M&A activity of the Latin American airline industry, 
which has not been the focus of much research, in the period 1996-2013. Using GARCH 
and OLS models, we show that some selling companiesobtain statistically significant 
abnormal returnsafter the announcementof M&As. However, when the merger is not 
strategic, companiespresent statistically significant negative abnormal returns. For their 
part, the resultsare not conclusivewhen analyzing the effecton the valueof buying 
companies.  
We expect the resultsof this studyto increase the understanding of the dynamics of 
corporate finance in the region;we also expect the results to be supporting material both for 
scholars interested in the subject of M&As and for decision makers in companies.It is 
important to be clear about the context in which negotiations andcompany performance 
take place within the functioning of theindustryat the national and international level andthe 
effectthat these negotiations and this performance have for valuecreation in companies. 
Given the datalimitations for the analyzed region, we recommend future studiesfor 
analyzing the effecton company value, according to the integrationstrategy employed 
(horizontal, vertical,or diversification).We also recommend analyzing some companiesthat 
had only recently started to be publicly traded or had a small number of eventswhen 
conducting our researchand investigatingthe effectof the changes of corporate controlon 
their returns.Similarly, the long-term behavior of airline performance after M&As should 
also be researched. 
Another important subject that should be examined is related to the impactof M&Ason the 
performance of the closest competitors to the selling companybecause, as established by 
Eckbo (1983) and GarciaandTrillas (2011), when companiesoperate in 
concentratedindustries,competitors see statistically significant positive abnormal returns, 
while in companiesfrom competitive industries,there is no impacton the returns of 
competitors.Additionally, the followingquestion is important: What makes the expansion of 
some companiesa success while others fail? Jensen (1993) establishes that companiesin 
mature sectors, with not much perspective for growth in their traditional marketsbut with 
abundant financial resources, may have incentives to expandbeyond their optimal 
boundaries. 
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Table 1 M&A events in the airline industryin Latin American countries 
Panel A: Selling companies events     
Selling Company Date Country Buying company 
Consorcio Aeromexico SAB de CV 07/10/1999 Mexico Seeking Buyer 
  26/04/2010 Mexico Aimia Inc 
Gol Linhas Aereas Inteligentes SA 19/09/2007 Brazil Fundo Asas 
  07/12/2011 Brazil Delta airlines 
  10/09/2012 Brazil Qatar Airways QSC 
Grupo Aeromexico SAB de CV 10/08/2011 Mexico Delta Air Lines Inc 
LAN Airlines SA 25/03/2009 Chile Costa verde Aeronautica 
TAM Linhas Aereas SA 22/10/2009 Brazil TAP-Transportes Aereos 
  13/08/2010 Brazil LAN Airlines SA 
Varig SA 11/11/2004 Brazil TAP-Transportes Aereos Portugueses SGPS SA 
  08/06/2006 Brazil NV Participacoes 
  19/07/2006 Brazil VARIG LOG 
  28/03/2007 Brazil Gol Linhas Aereas Inteligentes SA 
Panel B: Buying companies events     
Buying company Date Country Selling Company 
Avianca SA 29/06/2012 Colombia AeroGal 
Gol Linhas Aereas Inteligentes SA 28/03/2007 Brazil Varig SA 
  11/07/2011 Brazil WEBJET Linhas Aereas SA 
  07/12/2011 Brazil Passaredo Transportes Aereos 
LAN Airlines SA 23/08/1995 Chile Ladeco 
  27/06/1997 Chile San Alberto SA 
  20/12/2000 Chile Aerotransportes Mas de Carga SA de CV 
  06/12/2001 Chile Aerolinheas Brasileiras SA 
  02/03/2005 Chile Southern Winds SA 
  06/05/2010 Chile AerOasis SA 
  13/08/2010 Chile TAM SA 
  27/10/2010 Chile Aerovias de Integracion 
TAM Linhas Aereas SA 11/03/2009 Brazil Pantanal Linas Aereas SA 
  14/07/2010 Brazil Tam Milor Taxi Aereo Representacoes Marcas e Patentes SA 
Varig SA 06/02/2003 Brazil TAM SA 
Thistablepresents the M&A announcementsfor airlinesin Latin American countriesfrom the years 1996-2013. In panel A,we show the 
eventsfor selling companiesby date, country,andacquiring company. In panel B,we show the eventsfor buying companiesby date, 
country,andselling company.The following deals are excluded from the sample: a) leveraged buyouts (LBOs), spin-offs, 
recapitalizations, repurchases, and privatizations. 
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of daily performance of the sample 
Company N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Avianca SA 690 -0.04% 1.55% -13.70% 7.00% 
Consorcio Aeromexico SAB de CV 1876 0.15% 3.68% -41.83% 28.77% 
Grupo Aeromexico SAB de CV 709 -0.08% 1.46% -8.64% 10.54% 
Gol Linhas Aereas Inteligentes SA 2485 -0.04% 3.26% -24.36% 21.77% 
LAN Airlines SA 4373 0.09% 2.29% -28.22% 29.30% 
TAM Linhas Aereas SA 1894 0.08% 3.17% -13.93% 39.77% 
Varig SA 3177 0.03% 12.22% -415.50% 417.05% 
MSCI Emerging Markets Index 6261 0.02% 1.17% -9.99% 10.07% 
Thistableshows the descriptivestatistics of daily performancein the 1996-2013 periodfor the 
companiesfrom Latin Americaselected for the study. We also observe the statistics for the 
Emerging Market Index (MSCI). 
 
Table 3Number of M&A announcements in the airline industry in Latin American countries 
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total % 
Argentina 4 2 1 1 8 10.39%
Bolivia 1 1 1.30%
Brazil 1 1 2 1 1 3 2 2 2 2 4 3 1 25 32.47%
Chile 1 1 1 3 3.90%
Colombia 1 1 1 1 1 3 8 10.39%
Costa Rica 1 1 1.30%
Dominican Rep 1 1 1.30%
Ecuador 1 1 1 3 3.90%
El Salvador 1 1 1.30%
Mexico 2 1 2 1 3 1 5 2 17 22.08%
Paraguay 1 1 2 2.60%
Peru 1 1 1 2 5 6.49%
Venezuela 1 1 2 2.60%
Total 5 2 3 3 3 5 0 2 4 2 4 6 5 6 13 7 6 1 77 100.00%
This table reports the number of M&A announcements by year in Latin American countries, as reported by Datastream, in the 1996-
2013 period. The following deals are excluded from the sample: a) leveraged buyouts (LBOs), spin-offs, recapitalizations, repurchases, 
and privatizations. 
 
Table 4Number of M&A announcementsin the airline industryin Latin American countries, depending on the countryof origin of the 
buyer 
M&A type   1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total % 
National   4 2 1 1 1 3   2   1 3 5 5 2 8 6 2 1 47 61.04%
Regional   1   1     1     4 1       2 4   2   16 20.78%
Transnational Europe       1   1         1     2     1   6 7.79%
USA 1 1 1 1 1 5 6.49%
  Others       1 1                   1       3 3.90%
Total    5 2 3 3 3 5 0 2 4 2 4 6 5 6 13 7 6 1 77 100.00%
Thistablereports the number of M&A announcementsby year in Latin American countries, as reported by Datastream, in the 1996-
2013 period, depending on the country of origin of the buyer. The following deals are excluded from the sample: a) leveraged buyouts 
(LBOs), spin-offs, recapitalizations, repurchases, and privatizations. 
 
 
 
  
Table 5Number of M&A announcementsper strategy (targeting vs. diversification) andpayment method 
M&A type 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total % 
Targeting 2 2 3 1 2 2 1 1 1 3 3 5 5 3 2 36 46.75% 
Diversification 3 2 3 3 3 1 3 3 2 1 8 4 4 1 41 53.25% 
Payment in cash               1 1 1 1     1 2 1 1   9 11.69% 
Payment with shares 2 1 3 3.90% 
Payment with shares and cash 1 1 1.30% 
Not specified 3 2 3 3 3 5   1 3 1 3 5 5 5 10 6 5 1 64 83.12% 
Total  5 2 3 3 3 5 0 2 4 2 4 6 5 6 13 7 6 1 77 100.00% 
Thistablereports the number of M&A announcementsby year in Latin American countries, as reported by Datastream, by the type of 
deal. In the first classification, “Targeting” refers todeals within the same industrygiven by the first two digits of the SIC code of the 
buying and selling company, “Diversification” refers to other deals. The second classification is based on payment method: cash, 
shares, shares and cash, or not specified. The following deals are excluded from the sample: a) leveraged buyouts (LBOs), spin-offs, 
recapitalizations, repurchases, and privatizations.
Table 6Abnormal returnsof the selling companies 
  GARCH OLS 
Airlines Dummy Market Dummy Market 
Consorcio Aeromexico SAB de CV 0.0849*** 0.406*** 0.0822*** 0.423*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Gol Linhas Aereas Inteligentes SA 0.0207*** 0.641*** 0.0217** 0.620*** 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) 
Grupo Aeromexico SAB de CV 0.0127 0.356*** 0.0132 0.380*** 
  (0.76) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) 
LAN Airlines SA 0.00731 0.435*** 0.00696 0.425*** 
  (0.88) (0.00) (0.59) (0.00) 
TAM Linhas Aereas SA 0.0636*** 0.654*** 0.0581*** 0.650*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Varig SA -0.0271*** 0.525*** -0.121*** 0.581*** 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Thistablereports the abnormal returnsusing GARCH and OLS estimates for the selling 
companiesin the group of Latin American countriesin the 1996-2013 period. The following 
deals are excluded from the sample: a) leveraged buyouts (LBOs), spin-offs, 
recapitalizations, repurchases,andprivatizations. The p-values are in brackets. *, **,and *** 
represent significance at 10%, 5%,and 1%,respectively. 
 
 
 
  
Table 7 Abnormal returnsof the buying companies 
  GARCH OLS 
Airlines Dummy Market Dummy Market 
Avianca SA 0.00555 0.270*** 0.00656 0.276*** 
  (0.71) (0.00) (0.46) (0.00) 
Gol Linhas Aereas Inteligentes SA 0.0145* 0.659*** 0.0157 0.625*** 
  (0.08) (0.00) (0.14) (0.00) 
LAN Airlines SA 0.0202*** 0.426*** 0.0190*** 0.427*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
TAM Linhas Aereas SA 0.00276 0.653*** 0.00409 0.649*** 
  (0.85) (0.00) (0.74) (0.00) 
Varig SA -0.0416 0.560*** 0.0580 0.583*** 
  (0.36) (0.00) (0.41) (0.00) 
This table reports the abnormal returns using GARCH and OLS estimates for the buying 
companies in the group of Latin American countries in the 1996-2013 period. The 
following deals are excluded from the sample: a) leveraged buyouts (LBOs), spin-offs, 
recapitalizations, repurchases, and privatizations. The p-values are in brackets. *, **, and 
*** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Figure 1 Window estimate with event grouping for more than one event in (3) 
 
